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USS Bergall's Second war patrol
Submitted by
Don Small
an actual account
Don Small tells me he was in the FWD torpedo room while all this was happening Thanks Don for the story
The Pacific War is full of epic stories both of combat
between vessels, and the even older battle of men &
ships against the perils of the sea. One of the lesser
known encounters and epic damage control fights came
fifty-five years ago in December 1944, when U.S.S.
BERGALL engaged IJN MYOKO. A fascinating twist of fate
would bring these two together, and see them both
fighting to stay afloat against the odds.
The encounter had its beginnings at 1630 on 5
December, 1944, when USS BERGALL (SS-320) under
command of Commander J.M. Hyde departed Exmouth Gulf,
Australia bound for her assigned war patrol off the
Malayan and Indo-China coasts. Tagging along with Hyde
on Commander's training this journey was PCO Ben
Jarvis, whose previous service included USS Nautilus
and Sailfish. It would prove to be an curriculum. On
this journey BERGALL (and the Dace on the same general
mission) carried a load of anchored mines in her aft
torpedo tubes. The plan was to lay these off the
Indochina coast, along the long reef called Royalist
Bank. BERGALL's course was plotted to take her around
the eastern end of Java, via Lombok Strait, then
westward through the Flores Sea and finally through
Karimata Strait. This was the plan, and was followed.
As it so happened, at 1205 that same 5 December, the
IJN heavy cruiser MYOKO at Singapore received orders
from Combined Fleet. The MYOKO had been under repair
ever since being damaged on 23 October, 1944 en route
with the First Striking Force headed for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. An aerial
torpedo had struck on the
starboard side under the mainmast, flooding the after
engine room and generator room. Too crippled to
participate further, the MYOKO had limped back to
Brunei, and ultimately to Singapore, arriving on 2
November. She had been under repair since at Seletar
Naval Dockyard. Now Tokyo judged those repairs
sufficiently advanced for the MYOKO to attempt the
journey home for full repairs. According to the
orders, Captain Hajime Ishiwara of the MYOKO was
instructed to depart with USHIO for the Inland Sea in
company with a homeland-bound convoy "on or about 9
December. " Preparations were accordingly made.
However, come 9 December, the MYOKO's departure was
delayed. The postponement proved fateful indeed. For
on the morning of 9 December, BERGALL was just
emerging from Lombok Strait. Had MYOKO sailed on
schedule, the two ships would never have met. Instead,
the stage was set for an eventful encounter and mutual
drama of survival.
Commander Hyde of BERGALL of course was not aware of
this, and was expecting nothing particularly unusual
about this patrol save for the optimistic hopes always
entertained but seldom realized. His fairly new boat
was only on its second patrol, and made good progress
across the Flores Sea. However, a major fly in the
ointment appeared on 11 December. During routine
inspection of the torpedoes, it was found that #5 and
#6 both had developed leaks, and had lost considerable
air pressure. Though #6 was pulled out for
examination, #5 remained in the tube.
The next day, at 0700 12 December, the cruiser MYOKO
and destroyer USHIO got underway from Singapore,
heading for Japan via Camranh Bay. In a sense, it was
the blind leading the blind so to speak, in that both
vessels were damaged. For the USHIO had been damaged
also in an air attack at Manila on 13 November, and
had lost the use of her starboard turbine. This
limited her to 18 knots, but since MYOKO could barely
make 16, this made no difference. They were the
perfect pair to go home together, and for the voyage
the USHIO was placed under command of MYOKO's captain.
So it came to pass that sunset of 13 December found
the MYOKO and the BERGALL converging off Royalist
Bank. The day had not passed without incident. There
was great activity in the airwaves, for the Japanese
had sighted an enemy invasion convoy passing west
through the Sulu Sea. It was in fact, the Mindoro
invasion force, but the Japanese did not yet know
this. For all they knew, it was the long-feared
invasion of Luzon. A flurry of activity followed as
Southwest Area Fleet and Tokyo scrambled to prepare
for the invasion whereever it might land.
The Second Striking Force of VADm Kiyohide Shima had
departed Lingga for St. James the same hour MYOKO and
USHIO left Singapore, and thus was already en route to
a good standby position. Shima was ordered to wait at
St. James and prepare for a surface counter-attack the
moment the enemy's intentions were discovered.
Meanwhile, MYOKO and USHIO probably heard the flurry
of messages and orders passing across the airwaves,
but as it happened, none were directed to them. Their
original orders apparently stood; to proceed to the
western Inland Sea for docking and repairs. There
remained, of course, a slight chance that the
partly-operational heavy cruiser might yet be"drafted" for sudden duty after arriving at Saigon.
It was now there appeared a factor that was to foil
original orders, and erase any possibility of
involvement in new ones. It would be the catalyst that
set off one of the largest and least-known salvage
operations in Imperial Navy history. This would play a
heretofore unrecognized role in distracting and
disrupting Japanese Navy countermoves against Mindoro
till the beachhead was well established. This factor
and catalyst was the none other than USS BERGALL now
arrived and preparing to lay her mines off Royalist
Bank.
This was an extensive reef, and BERGALL had been
assigned to mine a section corresponding to a locale
termed `Point Decamo'. Sunset was approaching, and the
mining would take place that night. Hyde's boat was
just edging in over shallow water and PCO Jarvis was
in the wardroom when suddenly a high-powered radio
signal that blanked their receiver was reported. That
meant a powerful transmitter, and Jarvis informed the
skipper. He then immediately manned the #2 periscope
used for long-range spotting, and began scanning in
all directions. His vigilance was rewarded: at 1755 a
ship was sighted bearing 105, nearly due east, range
35,000 yards heading on a NE course at about 14 knots.
The mast appeared "stick-like", a high, non-commercial
radar aerial. From his previous experience CPO Jarvis
was convinced it was a man-of-war type mast, and Hyde
agreed. The skipper immediately swung the boat around
and put all four engines on maximum speed to try to
get ahead of the ship's track. By 1845 BERGALL was
gaining only very slowly, but the vibration of the
engines was so great Hyde was reluctantly forced to
slow to 18 knots. Thirty-five minutes later he was
rewarded when radar reported a firm contact at 26,000
yards, bearing steady at 102 degrees. BERGALL had made
position.
By 2011 the target was clearly in sight, on course 055
making about 16 knots, and was seen to have been worth
the chase. She was a large warship with a single
escort ahead of her starboard bow, that is, the
opposite side from where BERGALL was closing in. It
remained for the submarine to attack. Twenty minutes
later Hyde and his officers caught their breath. The
target was seen to be a heavy cruiser of the ATAGO or
TONE class, and the escort a light cruiser. Though a
thrilling target, it was also incredibly dangerous:
such a vessel could easily blow the BERGALL out of the
water. Nor could a submerged approach be tried, the
waters were too shallow. Finally, with her aft tubes
filled with mines, any attack angle would have to be
made with the bow tubes only.
Undaunted by all these obstacles, Hyde decided to run
BERGALL in under cover of the rapidly darkening skies
like a PT boat. He had to hope that the cruiser's
radar, detected making slow sweeps with long intervals
of silence, did not pick him up too soon. There was
one advantage; the escort was on the far side. At 2135
Hyde saw the escort drop back to a position abeam of
the target and blinker a signal. This was the moment,
when both ships were overlapped, the escort's bridge
and bow extending beyond the cruiser's! Two minutes
later, BERGALL commenced firing all bow tubes
(including leaking #5 torpedo) at a range of 3,300
yards, depth set for six feet on a track spread
ranging from 112 to 121 degrees port.
At 2140, at eight-second intervals, the first and
second torpedoes connected, with spectacular results.
Any further hits were completely lost in the
thundering explosion and balloon of fire that erupted.
BERGALL's stunned officers recorded in the ship's log
what happened next: "2040 [2140 Item] 2 hits heard but
unsure. Saw target break in two at after end of
bridge. Explosion forced two ends apart so that there
were two huge persistent fires which in ten minutes
were 1,000 yards apart. Radar now had three pips
instead of two, stern section had definite down angle
toward its newly acquired "bow". The bridge structure
was completely demolished and not seen after, although
the other parts of the hull were seen. Bow section had
a decided up angle. Escort made no effort to chase but
stopped abeam of the target while we opened to 10,000
yards."
This is approximately the angle that the Bergall had
on the Myoko.
From BERGALL's log it certainly appeared that the
heavy cruiser was all but finished. The damage
described was catastrophic. Nor did the escort make
any attempt to chase but had stopped dead--- BERGALL
was inclined to believe that it had apparently been
struck and damaged also. Hyde turned away to reload
before returning to deliver the coup-de-grace to the
escort, still assumed to be a light cruiser.
Funny just how misleading the flash and shapes of
night battle can be; for though MYOKO had indeed been
slammed by BERGALL's salvo, the situation was not all
as it appeared, albeit grave enough. At 2140 at least
one torpedo hit the cruiser on the port quarter,
setting off the volatile reserve oil tanks aft. The
result was the catastrophic blast Hyde had witnessed.
The afterdeck was completely shattered, it seems part
of the stern blown completely free. It drifted off,
burning and sinking. Fires broke out around MYOKO's
aft turrets, but despite appearances there was no
damage to the main body of the ship forward of the
mainmast.
Which is to say the MYOKO had been wounded sore, but
was not at all the shattered wreck Hyde beleived he
saw. The vessel was undamaged forward of the No. 5
turret though she was unable to steer. Neither had the
USHIO been hit. Instead, she had drawn up alongside to
determine status. While Captain Hajime Ishiwara waited
for news, Commander Masaomi Araki of USHIO was setting
a trap for the offending submarine. Feigning dead, he
waited to lure it in. He waited until the range was
3,000 yards, then at 2200 USHIO opened fire with a
well aimed two-gun salvo.
Caught by surprise, the BERGALL was nailed squarely.
With truly remarkable shooting, a shell of USHIO's
first salvo arced down from port, hit the back of the
forward torpedo loading trunk's hatch, tore through
it, and exited out the pressure hull starboard at
frame 35 without detonating. Water poured in through
the resulting hole "five foot square hole in the
starboard pressure hull" and the main ballast tank
began venting from the damage. But no one was killed:
two mess stewards whose bunks were in the overhead of
the forward torpedo found their bunks filled with
shrapnel and other debris. Fortunately, they had not
been in them at the time!
Taken aback, Hyde lost no time ordering the helm hard
over and standard speed on all four engines. It was
just in time, a second pair of shells fell into the
sea 200 yards off the port bow. USHIO snapped on a
searchlight, sweeping, but failed to fix on the
submarine. Looking down, the skipper could see that
the damage was severe, with compartment fires and
lights visible---the main hull was open to the air. As
Hyde sped away, there came a third and last salvo,
splashing water over the fleeing submarine's starboard
bow. The BERGALL bent on to 18 knots, determined to
put as much distance as possible between her and the
enemy by daybreak, for now she could no longer dive.
Daybreak was estimated at nine hours away. Mercifully,
the USHIO did not pursue her, having enough concern
with her charge.
Hyde and his crew had little doubt that USHIO's charge
was done for, for at 2206 he logged: "Saw a series of
explosions in the bow section of the cruiser. Shortly
after this the flames in the bow section appeared to
die out and the radar pip disappeared on this section.
A column of steam rose from it and a cloud of smoke
gathered over it." It appeared certain that the target
Atago-class cruiser, ablaze, broken in half, was
sinking, and that the escorting light cruiser was
damaged, for she had fired only one turret at BERGALL.
However, these impressions were false. It is
fascinating to examine just what did happen. First
off, as seen, the target's [MYOKO's] escort was not a
cruiser, but the destroyer USHIO. BERGALL's action
report opined that she had been struck by an 8-inch
shell, citing a measured 8-10-inch round hole punched
through her hull. But BERGALL herself clearly observed
that it was the escort that opened fire, and in any
case, though her fire-control radar may have assisted
USHIO, it seems unlikely that MYOKO brought her
turrets to bear after being hit. Further, three
two-gun salvos is perfectly consistent with the fore
turret of a Fubuki-class destroyer. The vagueries of
impact dynamics can be invoked to explain the
discrepancy between shell and hole size. One thing
seems clear: since the USHIO's main battery was 5-inch, the BERGALL must have
been struck by a 5-inch
shell. All of which takes nothing away from either the
skill of the Japanese gunner or the BERGALLIAN's
battle to save their ship the following days.
Then there is the matter of the damage observed and
that actually inflicted. At request, the details have
been investigated as thoroughly as possible. What
happened appears to be this: At 2140, one, possibly
even two of BERGALL's torpedoes struck MYOKO in the
port quarter about level with the outboard propellers.
This detonated the reserve oil tanks and shattered the
fantail. The MYOKO lost the use of her rudder and all
but the outboard port propeller were smashed. It seems
that pieces of the fantail definitely broke off,
because BERGALL reported three radar pips after the
explosion. After the hit, MYOKO signaled Southwest
Area Fleet she could still make 6 knots on one
remaining screw, but she was unable to steer. Hence,
it was necessary to arrange a tow, as will be seen.
Later, apparently, the damaged stern broke off further
on 17 December. However, given the observations of
both radar and eyewitnesses of the target being blown
in two sections, and one even observed to sink, it
seems something detached. Given the details of three
separate pips, fires drifted 1,000 yards apart, it
seems bold to dismiss them outright. Most likely, that
part of the MYOKO containing the rudder was severed at
impact, and oil covered, drifted away flaming to sink.
Whatever the actual hull failure damage at moment of
impact, the MYOKO had been completely disabled. The
fires were stubborn and continued to blaze, but the
crew shored up the point of breakage, and minimal
flooding had resulted. More remarkable, as noted the
port outboard shaft somehow remained operable, though
it projected naked from the sundered fantail. The
other three props were smashed and severed. All in
all, the damage was worse than that the previous
October.
The MYOKO could still make 6 knots using this last
shaft, so instead of evacuating his cruiser, Captain
Ishiwara resolved to save her. USHIO was asked to take
a tow line aboard. Captain Masomi Araki protested by
signal that because of his smashed starboard engine,
with the port engine alone USHIO did not have the
power to tow. But the MYOKO could make 6 knots; what
Ishiwara needed from USHIO was to be kept on the right
heading among the waves.
The destroyer appears to have agreed, and an arduous
and painful crawl began. From the 14th through the
15th the USHIOcontinued to struggle against the
worsening seas, striving to keep the MYOKO from
wobbling off course. Though her damaged engines could
not hope to tow the full weight of the crippled
cruiser, she could at least try to keep MYOKO's bow
headed for St. James. The cruiser's remaining
propeller did the rest, painfully shoving her forward,
mile by mile.
Her attacker too, was having her troubles. After
torpedoeing MYOKO, the BERGALL had retired from the
scene of the action at her best surface speed. The
night of the 13/14 was spent extinguishing small
electrical fires started by the water coming in, and
trying to move sound gear and other electrical motors
away from the gash in the hull. Mattresses were
stuffed into the hole to keep the spray out as best as
possible. Though there was no immediate danger of
further flooding, diving was still impossible. Dawn
brought redoubled vigilance and manning of all
available guns, for any aircraft bombing would have to
be evaded on the surface. Though repairs on the hatch
started at sunrise, and the holes were gradually
plugged with an amalgam of mattresses, wooden pegs,
and brazed plates, BERGALL could still not dive. The
nearest Allied base was from whence she had came ---
Exmouth Gulf, 2,000 miles away. In order to reach it,
she would have to proceed on the surface in broad
daylight though 1,200 miles of sky and sea patrolled
by the enemy!
All in all, this made for poor prospects for survival,
and though the game seemed up when a Mavis was sighted
to the northwest at 1210, Commander Hyde did not give
up easily. Turning away, he managed to lose the
aircraft apparently without being detected. Thereupon
he hit upon an idea. Instead of keeping wide of
Borneo's coast, he would run in toward it on a
converging course. Hopefully, from a distance she
would be taken for simply a boat headed for Brunei Bay
at day's end. The ruse appeared to work, and sunset
came without incident. At 2100 Hyde felt confident
enough to transmit a message of his attack, calling it
appropriately enough: "Busted BERGALL's First."
The morning of 15 December brought with it orders from
TF 71.1 for BERGALL to rendevous with other boats at
North Nateona. Commander Hyde was much vexed, and
after careful consideration decided to disregard the
order. To have complied would have required taking
BERGALL back on the surface in daylight through waters
she had just passed through, needlessly risking her
crew. Furthermore, Hyde was betting he could make
transit through Karimata Strait, across the Java Sea,
and then through the Lombok Strait to Australia
without encountering any aircraft. He had observed
none on two previous trips along the same route, and
the gamble seemed worth it. To better the odds
further, he would pace his speed to pass Karimata and
Lombok Straits in darkness.
The decision was made, and its wisdom soon affirmed.
At 0950 15 December USS ANGLER (H. Bissel Jr.
commanding) was picked up, bringing welcome company.
By 1105 the two submarine skippers were alongside each
other, talking by megaphone. After consultation, and
hearing ANGLER's report, Hyde was convinced he could
run the gauntlet safety. Course was set for Karimata
Strait, and it was decided that Angler would follow in
escort. Other than the continuing leakage, the
afternoon passed without a hitch, and at sunset both
boats were approaching Karimata Strait. Ironically, at
1216 that day, ComSubPac had issued an order for Hyde
to proceed to Dangerous Ground (reefs near Palawan
Island) south of Mindoro and scuttle the BERGALL!
Maintaining silence in these exposed waters, Hyde did
not reply to this, nor did ANGLER. For the next few
days, ComSubPac would be in the dark about the fate of
BERGALL and became increasingly anxious for her
safety.
For the two submarines, the next step was somewhat
risky , so the decision was made at 1905 to transfer
one officer and fifty-four men to the ANGLER.
Commander Hyde would stick aboard with a skeleton crew
to run her through the straits. With the weather so
favorable - overcast with heavy rain storms from the
north-northwest to foil aircraft - it seemed"unthinkable" to simply scuttle the BERGALL.
Volunteers for the skeleton crew were practically
unanamious, but eventually twenty-nine were chosen for
the task. Planning to sit on bottom in shallows if
necessary, at 2125 Hyde commenced the dash through
Karimata Strait. If they were attacked, all knew the
score: Hyde had ordered Bissel and ANGLER to attempt
no rescue, but "save your boat and the rest of my
men".
Meanwhile, far away aboard the MYOKO the fires were
still raging, and were not finally doused till 15
December. As with the American boat, the 15th saw
friends arriving. Two subchasers, the KAIKO and TATEBE
MARUS and two minesweepers of the 21 Special Base
force arrived, and the picture brightened for the
Japanese cruiser. TATEBE MARU passed a true tow line,
and towing commenced with MYOKO making 5 knots toward
St. James. However, the same storms that were cloaking
the BERGALL's dash were making the MYOKO's progress
labored.
At 0815 16 December, the limping pair were south of
St. James, and Captain Ishiwara released the USHIO
from her guard duty. She was unable to tow his
cruiser, and needed to proceed ahead into Saigon port
so as to escort convoy HI-82 due to depart the next
day for Japan. The subchasers continued their work,
but the seas steadily worsened and the forecast was
for truly severe weather. Therefore, before noon the
order came to reverse and tow MYOKO back to Singapore
instead. Hopefully the waters in that direction would
be more agreeable. MYOKO hove to and awaited the
arrival of ships with engines in suitable shape for
endurance towing. That help was soon forthcoming. At
1100 SWAF ordered DesRon 2 to prepare to send the
OYODO, KASUMI, and HATSUSHIMO out to where the MYOKO
lay.
At Singapore, Vice Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto heard
the news of MYOKO with some distress. As she belonged
to his Crudiv 5, he considered her his responsibility.
Thereupon he ordered his flagship HAGURO out of dock
at 1430 the 16th, boarded her, and reported that he
would load supplies tomorrow and sail to MYOKO's
rescue by the 18th. Since she was now in port, the
CHIBURI would follow in a few days, but Hashimoto
requested two additional guard ships.
MYOKO's attacker was at this time picking her way
across enemy-held waters toward Java in broad
daylight. The BERGALL had cleared Karimata Strait at
sunrise that morning, and was plowing southeasterly
with every nerve stretched to the utmost. All eyes
were skyward, searching for signs of the air attack
that could doom the submarine. None appeared. The 16th
passed with surprising calm. The only disturbance came
at the end, when at 1751 Hyde sighted the usual patrol
saildboat off Bawean Island. The "sighting however"
came in an unconventional way. Chuck Kennedy, wrote
the author that `it was already dark, and the BERGALL
was running silent. So silent that the patrol boat was
detected when BERGALL's guys heard the Japanese crew
on deck! Despite this rather harrowing means of
detection, the patrol boat was avoided without
difficulty.
The same lack of difficulty did not obtain for the
Japanese efforts to assist BERGALL's victim. At 2100
16 December USHIO arrived at St.James, and sent a
message emphasizing that with her storm damage and
only port shaft working, that she could not tow MYOKO.
A "healthy" vessel must be sent, the sooner the
better. The need for haste was punctuated at 0510 the
17th when the MYOKO's damaged stern completely parted
at frame 325 due to the heavy waves. The cruiser
remained afloat, but towing speed had to be cut to 2.5
knots. The situation was growing more precarious. In
response to this and Admiral Hashimoto's request the
KASUMI and HATSUSHIMO were ordered at 2300 the 17th to
abandon their convoying of NICHEI MARU to St.James and
to go to MYOKO's assistance.
That same hour, the BERGALL entered Lombok Strait on
the last lap of the voyage home. ComSubPac was still
in the dark about BERGALL's safety, sending a stream
of orders to fellow boats BASHAW and PADDLE that
searched the seas near Mindoro in vain, fearing the
worst.
By this time, bigger issues were intruding, and
Mindoro was no place to be. On 15 December, the
Japanese learned mysterious target of the American
invasion force. They were landing near San Jose base,
at Mindoro. The kamikaze attacks began even as the
first soldiers waded ashore. They damaged two escort
carriers and smashed two LSTs. Despite these losses,
the Americans pressed home the invasion with
characteristic thoroughness, and by sunset all troops
had been disembarked and General Dunckel was ashore.
The invasion was a success and Admiral Struble free to
return to Leyte Gulf. In the following days, Onishi's
kamikaze's continued to attack, but the beachhead was
little effected by them. The industrious engineers
went quickly to work building the planned airstrips
and soon fighters were flying from Mindoro.
Southwest Area Fleet also intended that the aerial
effort be supplemented by a night-surface attack on
the beachhead. The only warships sufficiently close
for an immediate attack, so important with landings,
was the Matsu-class escort destroyers that had been
ordered out of Manila the day before. They had left
this morning and were en route to Indo-China and were
now nearing Shinnan Gunto, or Dangerous Ground. It was
decided that they should be recalled and hurled
against the Mindoro beachhead. Since the moon phase
the night of the 15th would be 0.5, it was judged that
the attack had some chance of success.
These orders were sent to commander of Desdiv 43
Commander Kanma Ryokichi. He refused to consider them.
His ships were too short of fuel, guns in need of
service, and engines overworked and cranky. In truth,
he judged his flotilla really too weak to contemplate
such a thrust. Kanma continued on course for
Indo-China, sending an explanatory apology for his
failure to attempt the attack. Ironically, his ships
lay over at Dangerous Ground, where they might well
have made short work of crippled BERGALL if Hyde had
followed his original orders to proceed there!
When Manila heard that Desdiv 43 would not be
attempting its attack, there was a flurry of
conferences. Field Marshall Terauchi, General
Yamashita, and Admiral Mikawa and their staffs
hastened to agree on some response. The Southern Army
commander, aggressive as usual, wanted to launch a
counterlanding. General Yamashita was opposed--it was
bad enough that so much effort had been poured into
Leyte; he wasn't about to subscribe to similar wasted
effort for Mindoro. It was high time to prepare for
the invasion of Luzon itself. The Army staff agreed
with Yamashita that Luzon's defense was now priority,
but they insisted that strong effort be made to at
least forestall the use of airfields on Mindoro by the
enemy. In addition, the Navy was eager to make some
manner of offensive move using Shima's Second Striking
Force. So a joint ad-hoc compromise operation was
planned. A hybrid bombardment force would make a
high-speed "penetration" on a hit-and-run raid to
bombard the Mindoro beachhead while the Imperial Army
parachuted a small infantry raid to hamper our
airfield development.
One way or another, this was bound to involve the
units of Shima's 5th Fleet, but in exactly what way
remained to be fixed upon. But gathering these up
immediately was impossible, for a considerable number
of them were tied-down in the MYOKO affair. That
activity had developed into a major rescue-at-sea and
salvage effort, with a continuous stream of messages
back and forth between Singapore, St.James, and
Manila.
The morning of 17 December Shima's Second Striking
Force had hastily departed Camranh Bay after being
discovered by an enemy bomber the previous day. At
1500 December 18th, Shima steamed into St.James, where
NICHEI MARU had arrived earlier and was waiting to
provision 2-YB. At the same moment, just to the south,
the KASUMI and HATSUSHIMO were drawing up beside the
wallowing MYOKO. They found the cruiser still on an
even keel, and except for the mangled stern, rolling
easily. She appeared in no danger of sinking. Captain
Ishiwara blinkered that he was anxious for a tow
attempt.
Scarcely had preparations begun when the Saigon
airwaves crackled at 1530: Air-raid alert, for the
whole St. James area. Dismayed, KASUMI and HATSUSHIMO
moved off, as Ishiwara's tired crew manned the guns
and anxiously peered at the skies. In St. James
harbor, an equally frustrated Shima hastily gave
orders to cast off, and Second Striking Force quickly
put back to sea to avoid the anticipated raid. Two
hours passed, and no attack developed. Saigon was
passed by. At 1728 the alert was canceled as everyone
breathed sighs of relief. Wasting no time, Shima
promptly reversed course and put back into Saigon for
his interrupted provisioning. KASUMI and HATSUSHIMO
also returned quickly to the task at hand. It would be
dark before long.
The KASUMI closed the leeward side of the MYOKO,
passed a towline, and it was secured to the cruiser's
anchor chains. Then, as HATSUSHIMO stood guard to
seaward, the KASUMI moved slowly ahead. At 1733,
strain was taken up, and MYOKO began to make headway.
Speed was gradually built up, with course slowly
shaped to the southwest for Singapore in the troughs
of increasing swells.
As MYOKO's bow lifted and dipped between the swells
the hawser of course drew taut, then slack, then taut
again, putting a tremendous stress upon it. There was
nothing KASUMI could do, for the cruiser was many
times it's weight---it was hard enough to keep her on
course and moving, let alone correct her yawing. At
0238, the inevitable happened. With a great crack and
whipping, the tow line parted, snapping through the
stormy skies to fall into the sea.
The MYOKO, rolling heavily, immediately fell off into
the troughs of the mounting sea. At once, KASUMI put
about to attempt the difficult task of restoring the
tow in the darkness, while HATSUSHIMO scurried to keep
an even sharper watch for sign of enemy submarines. If
MYOKO was attacked now, she would be a sitting duck.
The frustrated Imperial Navy officers might have been
a little comforted if they had known just what bad
days the 18-19 December were proving for the U.S. Navy
as well. It was a real, and powerful, typhoon at sea.
It caught and battered Admiral Halsey's TF 38,
damaging several carriers and actually sending three
destroyers to the bottom.
The severe weather conditions now likewise forced
outright abandoning of the towing attempt. The
auxiliaries, two destroyers and the crippled cruiser
now settled down to a nerve-wracking wait for improved
seas. For four days they tossed and wallowed, unable
to do anything but wait. At 1050 on 19 December they
were joined by encouraging presence of of the HAGURO
and CHIBURI. But even the HAGURO could not get a tow
line secure in the wild seas. The wait continued,
while news arrived of further disaster: the new
carrier UNRYU had been torpedoed and sunk while en
route to Manila. The forces available to oppose the
Mindoro landing were being whittled away. Southwest
Area Fleet could no longer tolerate further delay.
At noon 20 December the beleaguered squadron was in
position 5-15'N, 104-45'E north of Malaya when orders
came that KASUMI was to break off the rescue operation
of MYOKO immediately and proceed as fast as possible
to St. James to become the flagship of Admiral Kimura
for a thrust against Mindoro. Southwest Area Fleet had
at last finalized it's plans for a counter-attack
against the Mindoro beachhead and Shima had received
his final orders that same morning at 0819 with
dispatch order 838 from VAdm Denkichi Okochi. An
"Intrusion Force" under Radm Masanori Kimura -
ComDesRon 2 - was to make a surface attack against
Mindoro. Kimura wanted his old flagship back, having
become quite attached to KASUMI since having to shift
his flag from ABUKUMA to her during the battle of
Surigao Strait. So at 1500, the KASUMI cast off her
tow. She did not join Kimura until 22 December,
further delaying the intended counterattack against
Mindoro. (It did not take place until Christmas Eve).
Miles and miles away, that same morning saw one of the
combatants complete its return home. The BERGALL made
a triumphant entry to Exmouth Gulf at sunrise, and at
0745 tied up with ANGLER alongside an oil barge. She
would not be staying long, just long enough to weld
some plates on the torpedo load hatch. Then she would
be underway again that afternoon for Freemantle. Her
patrol had lasted 21 days, nine of which were spent
north of the Malay barrier in enemy waters. The
gallant BERGALL arrived at Freemantle at noon 23
December, just in time for Christmas.
Meanwhile, it remained to be seen what would happen to
BERGALL's victim. The KASUMI's place was taken on 21
December by the CHIDORI, and major progress was made
at 0900 23 December when the weather moderated enough
for HAGURO herself to take MYOKO in tow. With the
heavy cruiser's powerful engines bent to the task, the
ordeal was near its end. The remaining miles were
crossed smoothly and at last, at 0238 on Christmas
Day, the beleaguered cruiser safely moored at Seletar.
She had been under tow seven days across submarine
infested waters. It is one of the most tenacious, and
least publicized salvage operations of the war.
It is an extraordinary story. Two warships - One
American, one Japanese - had traded blows with one
another, and each sent the other limping away. Both
arrived home after an epic struggle by their crews
fighting wind and wave. For Commander Hyde and the
BERGALL's bold crew, there came accolades in Australia
and a glowing endorsement from the Squadron Commander
J.F. Huffman:
"The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. BERGALL, not
only for the considerable damage inflicted on the
enemy but on the magnificent achievement of bringing
their damaged ship back. The decision to attempt this
in view of expected enemy opposition reflects credit
on an intrepid Commanding Officer and a Fighting Ship.
All hands will bend every effort to get this
stout-hearted crew back on the firing line as soon as
possible."
For Captain Ishiwara and the crew of the MYOKO's
splendid achievement, and their rescuers, there were
no commendations. The hard discipline of the Imperial
Navy decreed that such courage and tenacity was to be
expected, and could receive no official reward. And
though plucky BERGALL soon went to sea again,
unfortunately for Captain Ishiwara, his ship's injury
proved beyond Singapore's ability to restore. The
MYOKO's ruined aft section was cut off abaft No. 5
turret and the bulkhead there shored up to serve as
the new fantail. In that state, without propellers and
rudder, she was moored idle till the end of the war.
BERGALL had essentially sunk her; but it seems safe to
assume that getting home alive counted for something
among MYOKO's men.
Thus, though both combatants struggled and staggered
home, as Fortune decreed, only one returned to action.
As for the MYOKO, she languished post-war as a lodging
ship at Singapore until 2 July 1946. On that date the
ruined heavy cruiser was taken out on a slow tow. Six
days later, in the early hours of 8 July, she was
scuttled in the Straits of Malacca where she remains -
150 meters deep - to this day.